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1 Russell
The question of the limits of thought, for Russell, is really the question of what
is required to think of, or apprehend, a proposition. An immediate answer is
that in order for a proposition to be apprehended, the thinking subject must be
acquainted with each of its constituents. But the question then shifts, or better
it splits in several other questions. What is acquaintance? And what are to be
considered the constituents of a proposition?
In his paper “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”,
Russell defines the relation of acquaintance as follows:
I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive re-
lation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself. When
I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which
constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation. In fact, I
think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply
the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presen-
tation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same
thing as to say that O is presented to S (“Knowledge by Acquaintance and
Knowledge by Description”, p. 152).
Acquaintance, as it is presented here (and not only), is a dual relation between a
subject and an object. This relation is then characterized as one of direct aware-
ness, and assimilated to presentation; in other words, being acquainted with an
object means being immediately presented with it. As Russell points out in The
Problems of Philosophy, this direct awareness of things has to be conceived as
completely independent of any inferential process whatsoever and any knowl-
edge of truths (The Problems of Philosophy, p. 25). Now, Russell holds that one
can have such immediate awareness of: particulars, universals, abstract logical
facts, andmaybe of oneself. He believes that these are the possible constituents
of propositions, and that every understanding of a proposition must rely on the
acquaintance of a thinking subject with whichever of them figures in it. For the
purpose of my present work, I shall mainly focus on particulars, since Russell
maintains that they are the objects with which we are acquainted in the most
immediate sense.1
For Russell, particulars are designated by proper names. Thus, for what we
have seen, in order to apprehend or entertain the proposition expressed by a
1Acquaintance with universals, in fact, is only derived from acquaintance with particulars. In
“Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” Russell gives the example of the uni-
versal yellow, with which we can be acquainted only if we have seen a sufficient number of yellow
particulars. It is also for this reason, probably, that Russell uses a different technical term for the
kind of acquaintance one can havewith universals: "conceiving" (“Knowledge by Acquaintance and
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sentence that contains a proper name, onemust be acquainted with the partic-
ular designated by that name, which will figure among the constituents of the
proposition. More generally, if one wants to name a particular, he must be ac-
quainted with it. Russell expresses this thought in his “Theory of Knowledge”,
when he writes:
There is [. . . ] at any givenmoment a certain assemblage of objects to which I
could, if I chose, give proper names; these are the objects ofmy "awareness",
the objects "before mymind", or the objects that are within my present "ex-
perience" (“Theory of Knowledge”, p. 8).
If proper names designate particulars, then the objects I can name at any
givenmoment can only be the particularswithwhich I amcurrently acquainted,
the "objects ofmy awareness". In fact, I cannot name any particular thingwhich
liesbeyond theboundaries ofmy"present experience"or awareness, for inorder
to name a particular object I must be aware of it, and, since this is the case, that
object, if named, lieswithin the boundaries of my experience. Put another way,
if person s can entertain the proposition "I am not acquainted with a", where a
is a proper name that stands for a particular, then person s is acquainted with
the particular (designated by) a . Here we find a limit of thought: we cannot truly
and directly think of a particular we are not acquainted with, or, as Russell puts
it, we can never point to an object and say "This lies outside my present expe-
rience" (“Theory of Knowledge”, p. 10), where "this" is a proper name designat-
ing a particular. Now, by 1911 Russell maintains that the only particulars with
which we are acquainted are sense-data, at least in a wide sense.2 It is easy, from
here, to see the connections between the issues considered above and solipsism.
The rigorous and coherent solipsist draws an extrememetaphysical conclusion
from the self-refutation of every proposition of the form "This lies outside my
present experience", namely that no sense datum can be beyond what is part of
his present experience, which he considers all-embracing. But is he authorised
to draw such a conclusion? Is it right for him, in other words, to infer from the
fact that no instance of a non-acquainted particular can be truly and directly
thought of, that such a particular does not exist at all? Russell really believes it is
not.
In his “Theory of Knowledge” Russell tries to reject the solipsist’s conclusion.
To be sure, he admits that no instance of a particular with which we are not ac-
2Sense data taken in a wide sense include the objects of both "outer" and "inner" awareness, i.e.
both sense-data proper given in sensation, and private mental items (such as thoughts and desires)
given in introspection (“Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, p. 154, The
Problems of Philosophy, p. 28). In 1912, Russell also specified that we may have acquaintance in
memory, but in this case the objects of acquaintance would be either data of the "outer" awareness
or data of the "inner" awareness, and thus again sense-data taken in a large sense (The Problems of
Philosophy, p. 28). I leave aside the question of the acquaintance with the Self, since Russell was
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quainted canbe truly anddirectly thought of; which is to say: the singular propo-
sition "I am not acquaninted with a" cannot be both understood and true. But
Russell also points out that this does not prevent us thinking – without contra-
dictions – of the general proposition that there is something that is not currently
part of our experience. This proposition is of the form (∃x) ∼ Fx , and through
it wemay indirectly denote particulars with which we are not acquainted. What
is interesting, is that Russell argues that entertaining this kind of general propo-
sition does not necessarily require acquaintance with particulars, but only with
the universal F and the logical form subject-predicate.3 In other words, if we
take F to be the universal acquaintance (or being acquaintedwith), for Russell it
will be sufficient to be acquainted with the universal acquaintance and the logi-
cal form subject-predicate, in order to entertain the general proposition "There
is something I am not acquainted with". This proposition can be both enter-
tained and true for Russell, unlike its singular instance "I am not acquainted
with a", which cannot be true when entertained, as we have seen. In order to
prove the logical possibility of the truth of general propositions, independently
of acquaintancewith the particulars involved in their singular instances, Russell
gives the following example:
Wemay know Jones, paternity and the fact that everyman has a father. Then
we know that there is "the father of Jones", although we may never have ex-
perienced him (“Theory of Knowledge”, p. 34).
Which is to say: the general proposition "There is the father of Jones" – a propo-
sition of the form (∃x)Fx – can be true whether we have experienced or not the
father of Jones. Here Russell maintains that we can be acquainted not only with
universals (paternity) but also with people considered as particulars (Jones),
something he denied in “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by De-
scription”. But he does so only to show the type of logical possibility of the truth
of the general proposition, one that – he argues – does not require acquaintance
with any particular contained in its singular instances (here the actual father of
Jones). It is worth noting that, as Jones’ father can bemet, acquaintancewith the
particular (indirectly denotedby thedescription) "the father of Jones" is logically
possible in this case, although unnecessary for the logical possibility of the truth
of "There is the father of Jones". On the other hand, if wemaintain that the only
particulars with which we can be acquainted are sense-data, and if we consider
the general proposition "There is something I am not acquainted with", we see
that acquaintance with an instance of such a thing becomes logically impossi-
ble.
Nevertheless, the point made with the example of Jones’ father is still valid
3Unlike a proposition of the form Fa , which would also require acquaintance with the particular
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for Russell, namely that, as it is logically possible (and indeed extremely likely)
that "there is the father of Jones" even if I do not know directly Jones’ father, it
is logically possible as well that "there is something I am not acquainted with",
even if I do not – and cannot – know directly any instance of such a thing. Which
is to say: the logical possibility of the truth of a general proposition does not
depend on the conceivability of any of its singular instances. Aswe shall see, this
is a main difference between Russell’s account of generality and Wittgenstein’s
one. But more on that later.
For now, we may summarize the conclusion of this discussion as follows.
Taking himself to have demonstrated the logical possibility of the truth of the
general proposition "There is something I amnot acquaintedwith", Russell also
claims tohavedemonstrated that the solipsist isnot authorized todrawhismeta-
physical conclusion, and suggests, on the contrary, that we should assume as a
working hypothesis the existence of other people’s minds and of unperceived
physical things.
2 Wittgenstein
In order to understand Wittgenstein’s view on the limits of thought, it is impor-
tant to begin by noticing the commonalities with Russell’s view. Wittgenstein
inherits from Russell the conviction that the only symbolic function of a proper
name is standing for an object (T , 3.22). As a consequence, in order to under-
stand a sentence containing a proper name, one has to know, or be acquainted
with, the object the name stands for.4 Furthermore, by accepting this Russellian
thesis,Wittgenstein is also committed toaccepting, asRussell does, the view that
the proposition "I am not acquainted with a" can never be entertained and true
at the same time, for one has to be acquainted with the object designated by the
4Following Levine, in this paragraph I will equateWittgenstein’s use of "to know" [kennen] in the
Tractatus with "to be acquainted with" (“Logic and Solipsism”, 190, fn.35). Levine is aware that, in
a 1922 letter to Ogden, Wittgenstein himself resisted translating the German "kennen" (and cog-
nates) as "to be acquainted with" (and cognates), and rather preferred the verb "to know". However,
Levine quotes Wittgenstein’s very reason to do so, which runs as follows: "‘To be acquainted with’
– I think – hasn’t exactly the meaning I want, because it seems to me to imply somehow that one
knows a lot about an object, while ’to know’ here just means: I know it, but I needn’t know any-
thing about it". As Levine argues, this would suggest that Wittgenstein likely wanted to maintain
and strengthen the Russellian distinction between knowledge of things (for which Russell reserves
the term "acquaintance") and knowledge of truths, and that his choice of translation was just made
to avoid an unwanted connotation of the phrase "to be acquaintedwith", namely the empiricist one
(on this point, see also “Use and Reference of Names”, p. 30). This is of course related to the problem
of the objects of acquaintance. In Russell’s case, they are sense-data; but in Wittgenstein’s one, as
I shall argue, they are not, since Tractarian objects are given a priori. We may however continue to
use "to be acquainted with" alongside withWittgenstein’s "to know". It will just suffice to remember
that Wittgenstenian objects, as opposed to Russellian ones, are items our acquaintance with which
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proper name a in order to entertain the proposition in the first place. Keeping
these similarities inmind, we cannowbegin to examine the differences between
Wittgenstein and Russell’s conception of the limits of thought.
Thekey tounderstanding thesedifferences really lies inWittgenstein’s notion
of object, which is completely different fromRussell’s. To be sure, bothmaintain
that an object is to be designated by a proper name; however, while for Russell
the objects that proper names stand for are mainly sense-data, Wittgenstein’s
objects should not be identified with sense-data instead. It is true that many
commentators in the past have done so (among others Investigating Wittgen-
stein). But the idea that Tractarian objects are sense-data is not as popular as
once was (“Does the Tractatus contain a private language argument?”, p. 148). I
shall argue against it, and try to present my own view on Wittgenstein’s notion
of object, in order to understand his conception of the limits of thought.
In someof thefirst remarks of theTractatus,Wittgenstein gives his account of
objecthood. First of all, objects are not self-subsistent. The essence of aWittgen-
stenian object, in fact, is being relational, being a constitutive part of a concate-
nation of objects, that Wittgenstein calls state of affairs (T , 2.01 - 2.011). In the
state of affairs, i.e. in adeterminate concatenationof objects, the object assumes
its external (or material) properties; but these properties are contingent, as we
can,with amental exercise, deprive theobject of themand, afterwards, continue
to think of something. What we cannot think of, however, is an object in isola-
tion, outside the possibility of its concatenation with other objects (T , 2.0121).
Thus, there are properties that an objectmust have, andwithoutwhich it cannot
be thought of; Wittgenstein calls them internal or formal – as opposed to exter-
nal ormaterial – properties (T , 4.123). In short, formal properties can be seen as
the possibilities of the combination of an object with other objects in states of
affairs (“The supposed Realism of the Tractatus”, p. 84), and they are necessary
(non-contingent) features of objects themselves. Now, Wittgenstein writes:
[L]ogicdealswitheverypossibility andall possibilities are its facts (T , 2.0121).
If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I
must know all its internal properties (T , 2.01231).
And further,
The ’experience’ that we need in order to understand logic is not that such
and such is the case, but that something is: that, however, is not an experi-
ence. Logic is prior to every experience – that something is so. It is prior to
the ’How’, not prior to the ’What’ (T , 5.552).
As logic deals with all possibilities, where "all possibilities" are all possibilities
of occurrence of objects within states of affairs, it is clear that logic has to deal
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of affairs are none other than their formal properties, which, by 2.01231, are
the properties whose knowledge is required to knowobjects themselves, regard-
less of knowledge of material properties. Since this is the case, the objects that
Wittgenstein has inmind – andwithwhich logic has to deal –will be, so to speak,
formal objects, not primarily material ones. And this is why we should not iden-
tify Wittgenstenian objects with sense-data.5
I introduce the term "formal objects" on the understanding that they must
not be thought of as logical objects, the existence of whichWittgenstein denies,
but rather, I believe, as objects in their pure form; which is to say: objects as
bearers of formal properties, independently of the material ones (that objects
nonetheless must possess).6
This characterization clarifies, I hope, Wittgenstein’s statement that logic is
prior to every experience that things are so and so, i.e. every experience of the
material properties of objects. Indeed, logic isprior to the "How", i.e. thewayob-
jects are linked in thedeterminate state of affairs, andbywhich theyacquire their
material properties. This very way, in fact, is in itself contingent, and logic can-
not be concerned with contingencies. However, logic is not prior to the "What",
which I interpret as the givenness of objects within the possibility of their occur-
rence in states of affairs, or, in a word, as their givenness as formal objects.7 For,
otherwise, logic would be prior to the very objects (and combinatorial possibil-
ities) with which it busies itself, and would therefore be completely empty. In
other words, although formal objects can be given a priori, i.e. independently
of the experience that things are so and so, they must nonetheless somehow be
given, and logic cannot be prior to this givenness, or otherwise there could be a
logic without a world (but then how could there be a logic at all?). For this rea-
son, formal objects are to be regarded as the substance of the world (T , 2.021),
if logic, and with it language as a picture of the world, are to be possible (see T ,
5.5521).
5Part of the background of this interpretation goes back to Hide Ishiguro’s paper “Use and Refer-
ence of Names” (1969). There, Ishiguro argues that in the Tractatus "to be an object [. . . ] is a purely
logical notion" (pp.26-27), and thus that Tractarian objects should be identified neither with spatio-
temporal objects, norwith sense-data (p.47). It is alsoworth noticing that the identity of a Tractarian
object is exhausted by formal, as opposed tomaterial, criteria, namely 1) its combinatorial possibili-
ties and2) its beingnumerically distinct fromother objectswith the samecombinatorial possibilities
(seeT , 2.0233).
6I believe that the "shifting use of the word object" (T , 4.123) which Wittgenstein refers to, may
be linked to this issue. In fact, in one sense objects may be considered just as bearers of formal
properties, in another one as bearers of both formal and material properties. Logic just deals with
the first sense (or use) of theword "object", and thus it is not concerned in giving empirical examples
of objects. On this point see Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir , p. 70.
7I am well aware that Wittgenstein, during one of his conversations with Schlick, links the ques-
tion of the "What" to the existence of facts (Ludwig Wittgenstein e il Circolo di Vienna, p. 64). How-
ever, the existence and the givenness of facts relies on the existence and givenness of objects, being
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Now, since objects are exclusively thinkable within the possibility of their oc-
currence in states of affairs, then no object could ever be thought of outside the
possibility of such an occurrence, i.e. outside of its givenness as a formal object
(see T , 2.0121). But it is clear that, if this is the case, as soon as formal objects
are given, the limits of logic end up to be "the limits of the world" (T , 5.61). In
fact, since I can "only" think of what is given, that is formal objects, logic –which
deals with all the possibilities – can neither exceed nor fall short of what is given;
thought andworldmust have the same limits. Put another way, if formal objects
are given, then all objects I can think of are given, and they are simply all objects:
my world becomes the world (see T , 5.62). As a consequence, for Wittgenstein,
Russell cannot be right when he argues that the proposition "there is something
I am not acquainted with" may be both understood and true; for this proposi-
tion states that there is an object I am not directly given, that is, in my interpre-
tation of Wittgenstein, an object outside the possibility of logically thinking of
it against the background of concatenation, which really seems the possibility
tout court for an object to be part of the world, if we take seriously 5.61. Thus,
Wittgenstein’s account of the general propositions of the form (∃x)Fx must be
quite different from Russell’s. As he writes in hisNotebooks:
Do not forget that (∃x)Fx does not mean: There is an x such that Fx , but:
There is a true proposition "Fx" (N , 9.7.16).
Toavoid the threat of solipsism, Russell understood (∃x)Fx as "There is an x such
that Fx", and not as "There is a true proposition Fx". This way he could main-
tain that general propositionsmay be both understood and true, independently
of acquaintancewith the particulars contained (andnamed) in their singular in-
stances. Thus, wemay know that "There is the father of Jones" without knowing
that "Robert is the father of Jones" (or Michael, or Lucas, exc.). Similarly, I may
think truly that "There is something I am not acquainted with", without being
able to entertain truly the proposition "I am not acquainted with a" (or b , or c ,
exc.). That is: I may think truly that "There is something I am not acquainted
with" without being given the particular a , or b , or c , exc. However, this is quite
problematic for Wittgenstein. For if I am not given something, how can I talk
about it by means of general proposition? How can a quantifier range over ob-
jects that are not given? This is really the core of the problem of the "What".
In fact, if I am not given the objects that are supposed to fall in the range of the
quantifier, then it is hard tounderstandonwhat I amquantifyingover in thefirst
place. Indeed, the very idea that a quantifier can range over non-given objects
appears incoherent to Wittgenstein, for it would mean that there is a logical re-
lation between the general proposition on the one hand, and singular sentences
I cannot possibly understand on the other, i.e. singular sentences about objects
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can there be a logical relation that goes outside the totality of objects I am given?
This would require the limits of logic to exceed the limits of theworld, but at that
point logic would be empty. For this reason, Russell cannot be right; his con-
ception of generality – in Wittgenstein’s view – tries to set the limits of thought
further than the limits of the world, i.e. further than any-thing we can think of.
Thus, for Wittgenstein (∃x)Fx does not mean "There is an x such that Fx",
but rather "There is a true proposition Fx". In other words, what (∃x)Fx really
means is "Fa∨Fb∨Fc∨. . . ". InWittgenstein’s conception of generality, a general
quantified sentence like (∃x)Fx is then a construction from singular sentences of
the form Fx , like Fa , Fb , Fc , and so on.8 In parallel fashion, applying the opera-
tor of negation " ∼ " to F in (∃x)Fx , the resulting general proposition (∃x) ∼ Fx
will mean "∼ Fa∨ ∼ Fb∨ ∼ Fc ∨ . . . ". If we now take the general proposition
of the form (∃x) ∼ Fx which Russell is committed to, namely "There is some-
thing I am not acquainted with", we see that for Wittgenstein it really means
"∼ Aa∨ ∼ Ab∨ ∼ Ac ∨ . . . ", where I use the letter A as a sign for the universal
acquaintance or being acquainted with. It is clear, for what we have seen, that
none of these singular propositions (i.e. ∼ Aa, ∼ Ab , etc.) can ever be simul-
taneously understood and true for both Russell and Wittgenstein. However, in
Wittgenstein’s case, as opposed to Russell’s, the general proposition (∃x) ∼ Ax
cannot be both understood and true either, since it is just a construction from
its singular instances (and hence a truth-function of them).
Nevertheless, that (∃x) ∼ Ax cannot be both understood and true does not
mean we are authorized to say that it is false. For Wittgenstein, we cannot state
with sense the solipsistic thesis that "there are no objects with which I am not
acquainted", since, as he points out:
[W]e cannot say in logic ’The world has this in it, and this, but not that’. For
that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibili-
ties, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go
beyond the limits of the world (T , 5.61).
Toput it in the twistingwords of AdrianMoore, "if there is no such thing as either
thinking or saying something, then there is no such thing as either thinking or
saying that there is no such thing as either thinking or saying that thing" (The
Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things, p. 244). This is why,
although "what solipsism means is quite correct", it is nonsensical [unsinnig ]
to put its thesis into words (T , 5.62). For a further discussion of this problem,
however, I will have to wait for a future occasion.
8For a careful usage of the idiom "construction" in this context, see “Does the Tractatus contain
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